On the other hand, first and second owner’sowners' risks have been decreased and, in thisthese aspiration levels, the second owner has more of an advantage over the first owner. Thus, the risk of the second owner will be decreased. Also, at aspiration levels between 0.3 to 0.7, all owner’sowners' risks have been decreased by half. However, at aspiration level 0.8, the first owner’s risk has increased compared to the second and third owner’sowners' decreased risks. At aspiration level 0.9, both the first owner’s and second owner’s risks have increased compared to the third owner’s risk, which ishas decreased. At this aspiration level, the second owner has worsthigher losses on the risk function. Until aspiration level 0.9, this owner has the most benefit over the other owners. However, at aspiration level 0.9, the second owner’s risk dramatically increases. Finally, at aspiration level 1.0, the second owner’s risk ishas changed from %4444% to %13.7613.76%, and first owner’s risk ishas increased from %12.1712.17% to %22.4022.40%, which has the biggest disadvantage in comparison to the other owners. It can be easily seen from Fig. 9,: in a grand coalitionalcoalition case for all aspiration levels, the third owner always benefits from this coalition. From this ownerowner's perspective, realizing this knowledge, a rational third owner is willing to form thea coalition with other owners. From the supper-additive perspectivessuper-additive perspective of characteristic function v (c_m), that is totalthe total amount of flow allocated by each coalition, the owners seek to maximize their allocation. Considered game satisfy the suppersuper additivity in terms of v (c_m), therefore from this perspective it is impossible to get lower flow value in the coalition thanthan in the case of acting alone. It is also important to point out that aspiration level 0.8 is a turning point for the second owner, i.e. the value above which he will not be willing to take any risks.